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JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0) (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Whether the trial court properly granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Personal Jurisdiction.
Standard of Review: An appeal from a pretrial jurisdictional decision presents only
legal questions that are reviewed for correctness. Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking
Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1992).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-27-24 (Supp. 1999) provides in pertinent part:

Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether or not a
citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any
of the following enumerated acts, submits himself... to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this state as to any claim arising from or related to:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state;
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by breach
of warranty;
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this state .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case. Plaintiff ("Ho") sued Jim's Enterprises, Inc., a Nevada
corporation, which does business as the Silver Smith Casino Resort in Wendover, Nevada

1

("Silver Smith"). She claims she was injured when a Silver Smith employee struck her in
the back with a serving tray as she was waiting for a place to play at one of the gaming
tables. Hofs complaint sounds in negligence. Record at 1-7.
Course of Proceedings Below. Silver Smith did not answer Hofs complaint, but
filed its Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and a memorandum in
support which included the Affidavit of Linda Sweat, the Executive Director of
Administration of the Silver Smith. Record at 12-25. After the motion was fully briefed,
the court entered a minute entry, granting it. Record at 76-77.
During the pendency of the Motion to Dismiss, Ho submitted interrogatories and
requests for production of documents to the Silver Smith. Record at 26. Silver Smith
responded to interrogatories 8 and 9, the only interrogatories which sought jurisdictional
facts. Record at 71-75.
After the trial court entered its minute entry granting the motion to dismiss, Ho
filed a Motion to Reconsider, accompanied by a Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s
Motion to Reconsider, Request for Oral Argument, Leave on Discoveries. Record at 79115. After being fully briefed, the court denied the motion to reconsider. Record at 168169, 170-71. It was not until after the Motion to Reconsider was decided that the court
entered the Order of Dismissal. Record at 172-73.
Statement of Facts.
1.

Jim's Enterprises, Inc. is a Nevada corporation which operates the Silver

Smith Casino Resort in Wendover, Nevada. Record at 19.
2

2.

On September 29, 1998, while waiting for a gaming table at Silver Smith's

casino in Wendover, Nevada, Ho was struck by a serving tray held by a Silver Smith
employee. She claims she was injured as a result. Record at 1-7.
3.

Silver Smith advertises the hotel and casino in Utah and other states.

Record at 1,2, 19,72.
4.

Silver Smith purchases some supplies and services from merchants in Utah,

Nevada and other states. Record at 19.
7.

Silver Smith leases some real property in Utah for parking lot and storage

facilities. Record at 19, 73; see also record at 1, 2.
9.

Silver Smith does not own any real property in Utah, is not registered to do

business within the State of Utah and does not offer for sale in Utah any goods or
services. Record at 19, 73.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. The activities of the Silver Smith are not substantial and continuous and
tantamount to doing business in Utah. The business of the Silver Smith is operating a
hotel and casino in Nevada. In carrying out this business, it buys some goods and
services from merchants in Utah, Nevada and other states, advertises in Utah and other
states and leases property in Utah for storage and parking lot purposes. It does not offer
goods or services for sale in Utah, is not registered to do business in Utah and does not
own any real property in Utah.

3

This is the sole evidence properly before the lower court. Improperly, Ho attached
to her brief discovery from other cases, information from the Internet, advertising and
telephone book listings, State of Nevada filings concerning Jim's Enterprises, Inc., copies
of old stationery of State Line Properties, Ltd. (a Utah limited partnership) and insurance
policy pages from another case. See attachments A-G, I-K of appellant's brief. None of
these items was submitted to the trial court and should not be considered by this Court.
The activities of the Silver Smith in Utah are not as extensive as those of the State
Line in Buddensick v. Stateline Hotel Inc., 972 P.2d 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) cert,
denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999), cert denied, 145 L.Ed. 2d 253, 120 S.Ct. 324 (1999). In
Buddensick, the Court of Appeals held that the State Line's activities in Utah were
substantial and continuous based on its extensive advertising and promotional activities in
Utah including maintaining a toll-free telephone number, its leasing five parcels of
property in Utah, two of which were for parking lot and signage purposes, contracting for
goods and services with Utah corporations (food, linens, advertisements and professional
services), maintaining two post office boxes in Utah, two telephone numbers, and six fax
numbers in Utah. Id. at 931. By contrast, the evidence before the lower court in this case
was that the Silver Smith advertised in Utah, purchased some goods and services from
Utah merchants, and was a lessee under a lease of property for parking lot and storage
purposes.
A state's power to exercise general personal jurisdiction is limited by the Due
Process Clause. The Silver Smith's activities in Utah are not as extensive as the
4

defendant s in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co,, 342 U.S. 437, 96 L.Ed. 485,
72 S.Ct. 413 (1952), in which the United States Supreme Court held there was general
jurisdiction, or even the defendant in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, s I

• ;/.-,

466U.S. 408, 80L.Ed. 204, KMSCl. ISO'S ( M)8M, m wlm/li Ihe -,-•-

• ""3

•;.

defendant' s contacts in the foi i in I w ere insufficient to confer general jurisdiction.
II. Unquestionably, Ho's injuries did not arise out of nor are they related to Silver
Smith's (1) entering into transactions in Utah or (2) owning, using or possessing real
property in Utah. The injury was not caused in Utah nor did Silver Smith offer good
services for sale in I Jtal i Ilii is, there is no specific pei soi lal jur isdiction o\ ei t;f^ NI?<. Smith. Even if there were, however, the Court must employ a due process analysis to
determine whether the Silver Smith could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in
Utah and must balance the forum state's interest in the litigation with that of the foreign
state and the parties.
I lo's injuries did i lot ai ise fron I an.) conduct of the Silver Smith in Utah. iio
alleges that the Silver Smith failed to maintain its premises safely, failed to warn and
failed to properly train employees. Record at 1-7. None of this conduct arises out of or is
related to the Silver Smith's transacting business in I Mali oi r\\ nun.!, operating or
possessing real pmpnlv in 1 Mali In addition, Ho's injuries were caused in Nevada, not in
Utah. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot meet her relatively light burden of making a prima
facie showing of specific personal jurisdiction over the Silver Smith.

5

Utah does not have nearly the interest in adjudicating Plaintiffs claim as does
Nevada, a state with a strong interest in ensuring that its hotels and casinos are maintained
in a reasonably safe condition for its guests. Plaintiffs interest in having her claim
efficiently and fairly litigated would have been promoted in Nevada.
Accordingly, Utah's long arm statute does not confer specific personal jurisdiction
over State Line Hotel, and the trial court properly granted Silver Smith's Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction.
III. Silver Smith did not conceal directly adverse legal authority from the court or
Ho. First, any issue with respect to the trial court's not considering Buddensick in
deciding Silver Smith's motion to dismiss is moot. The court considered Buddensick in
ruling on Ho's motion to reconsider. If the trial court found Buddensick to be directly
adverse, it could have vacated its minute entry granting the motion to dismiss. Moreover,
the court's ruling is reviewed for correctness. Thus, if this court determines that the trial
court properly granted the motion to dismiss, it is irrelevant whether the trial court
actually considered Buddensick.
Second, Buddensick is not directly adverse.
"In determining whether a foreign corporation is doing business in a state
for jurisdictional purposes, each case factually must be examined as it
arises. A hard and fast formula cannot determine algebraically every case."
Buddensick 972 P.2d at 930 (quoting McGriff v. Charles Antell Inc., 123 Utah 166, 256
P.2d 703, 704 (1953)) (emphasis added). Buddensick is not directly adverse authority,
and the Rules of Professional Conduct do not require adverse parties to cite as authority
6

cases which are simply unfavorable. The conduct of the State Line in Buddensick which
supported the Court of Appeals' holding that Utah courts could exercise general personal
jurisdiction over the State Line was far more extensive than the Silver Smith s condtnl
Jim's Enterprise, Inc. and State I ine I lotel, Inc. ai e different entities; and "I Jtah law
requires that "each case factually must be examined as it arises. " Id.
Third, Ho alleged only specific personal jurisdiction in her complaint, and cited
specifically to Utah's Long Arm Statute. Record at 2. Silver Smith argued in its
principal memorandum that there was no specific personal jurisdiction Plaintiff iinelun It d
J tenuous .ygtminil in hei mnnommlum in opposition that general personal jurisdiction
was appropriate, but did not plead it, did not seek to amend her complaint and did not
seek discovery on jurisdiction (other than the two interrogatories she previously
submitted which sought jurisdictional facts); as was her right under Anderson \, Anient an
Society of Plastic Surgeons, 807 V 2d K25 (I Itah 1990), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 900, 116
L.Ed. 2d 228, 112 S.Ct. 276 (1991).
ARGUMENT
I.
THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE GENERAL PERSONAL
JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT
Jurisdiction over the person is broken down into two categories. A court can have
general jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant. This Court has
stated:

7

General personal jurisdiction permits a court to exercise power over a
defendant without regard to the subject of the claim asserted. For such
jurisdiction to exist, the defendant must be conducting substantial and
continuous local activity in the forum state. In contrast, specific personal
jurisdiction gives a court power over a defendant only with respect to
claims arising out of the particular activities of the defendant in the forum
state. For such jurisdiction to exist, the defendant must have certain
minimum local contacts.
Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1992)
(emphasis added) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408, 414 (1984)); Abbot G.M. Diesel, Inc., v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 578 P.2d 850, 853 n.6
(Utah 1978).
In Mallory Engineering, Inc. v. TedR. Brown & Associates, Inc., 618 P.2d 1004
(Utah 1980) cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1029, 66 L.Ed. 2d 492,101 S.Ct. 602 (1980), the Utah
Supreme Court explained the distinction between the "minimal contact" and "doing
business" standards.
The significance of the difference is found in part in the distinction between
general jurisdiction and special jurisdiction. If the defendant's nexus with
the state is such that he is "doing business" in the state, the jurisdiction of
the court applies generally and he is rendered amenable in the state courts
for any cause of action. This jurisdictional standard is embodied in
U.R.C.P. § 4(e)(4), and the Long Arm Statute need not be employed.
Conversely, if the activities of the defendant are limited in nature or
transitory in duration, the courts may assume jurisdiction over that person
only in relation to causes of action related to the activity of the defendant in
the state. To assume this "special" jurisdiction, the courts must employ the
Long Arm Statute.
Id. at 1006 n.4 (citing Producer's Livestock Loan Co. v. Miller, 580 P.2d 603, 605 (Utah
1978); Strachan, In Personam Jurisdiction in Utah, 1977 U T A H L . REV. 235 (1977)). See

8

also 41)boi G h I Diesel, 578 P.2d at 853 n.6, wherein the Court, quoting the Strachan
article, stated that general personal jurisdiction requires "substantial and continuous local
activity"; Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Portadrill, 608 P.2d 244 (Utah

M } (defendant was IMI

doing business in Utah which would require substan

* ty;

tiefendarif did not sell products tor use in I tah except to plaintiff).
As with specific jurisdiction, a state's power to exercise "general" jurisdiction is
limited by the Due Process Clause. In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia s
466U.S.408, 80 L.Ed.2d 404, 104S.it ISOK (1983), a general

v

J

;

•• ^

United States Supicme 1 ouit confirmed thul ' p| I Pit; (>nr Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment operates to limit the power of the State to assert in personam jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant." 466 U.S. at 413-14.1
In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining C o., A 2 11 S 45? % I .hi 48!) m,2
S.Ct. 413 (1952), a shareholder sued the mining company in Ohio, e\ en though the
corporation was organized under the law s of the Philippine Islands I he United States
SiipieDH* ("out! framed the issue as "whether, as a matter of federal due process, the
business done in Ohio by the respondent mining company was sufficiently substantial and
of such a nature as to permit Ohio to entertain a cause of action against a foreign
1

In Buddensick v. Stateline Hotel, Inc., 972 P.2d 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), the court
of appeals failed to consider the Due Process implications of its decision. Silver Smith
respectfully contends that the Utah Court of Appeals' decision is in conflict with
controlling United States Supreme Court authority. Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1983); Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining
Co., 342 U.S. 437(1952).
9

corporation, where the cause of action arose from activities entirely distinct from its
activities in Ohio." Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447. The Court then summarized Benguet's
activities in Ohio as follows:
The company's mining properties were in the Philippine Islands. Its
operations there were completely halted during the occupation of the
Islands by the Japanese. During that interim the president, who was also
the general manager and principal stockholder of the company, returned to
his home in Clermont County, Ohio. There he maintained an office in
which he conducted his personal affairs and did many things on behalf of
the company. He kept there office files of the company. He carried on
there correspondence relating to the business of the company and to its
employees. He drew and distributed there salary checks on behalf of the
company, both in his own favor as president and in favor of two company
secretaries who worked there with him. He used and maintained in
Clermont County, Ohio, two active bank accounts carrying substantial
balances of company funds. A bank in Hamilton County, Ohio, acted as
transfer agent for the stock of the company. Several directors' meetings
were held at his office or home in Clermont County. From that office he
supervised policies dealing with the rehabilitation of the corporation's
properties in the Philippines and he dispatched funds to cover purchases of
machinery for such rehabilitation. Thus he carried on in Ohio a continuous
and systematic supervision of the necessarily limited wartime activities of
the company.
Id. at 447-48. Under these circumstances, the Court permitted Ohio to exercise
jurisdiction over the mining company for matters unrelated to the forum state activity.
On the other end of the spectrum is Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall 466 U.S. 408, 80 L.Ed.2d 404, 104 S.Ct. 1868 (1983). There, the plaintiffs were
residents of Texas and heirs of persons killed in a helicopter crash in Peru. They sought
to assert jurisdiction over the helicopter operator, a Colombian corporation, in Texas.

10

The United States Supreme Court stated that "[w]e thus must explore the nature of
Helicol's contacts with the State of Texas to determine whether they constitute the kind of
continuous and systematic general business contacts that the Court found to exist in
Perkins."/*/ at 4 1 ' If), Hit1*' ouit sutnmaii/nl Hdirnrs ,n*l»\ ilies in Texas as follows:
It is undisputed that Helicol does not have a place of business in Texas and
never has been licensed to do business in the State. Basically, Helicol's
contacts with Texas consisted of sending its chief executive officer to
Houston for a contract-negotiation session; accepting into its New York
bank account checks drawn on a Houston bank, purchasing helicopters,
equipment, and training services from Bell Helicopter for substantial sums;
and sending personnel to Bell's facilities in Fort Worth for training.
iu1 ul-IK) On thi1- loioul (hi ' I H ii I »"one I tided that "Helicol's contacts with the State of
Texas were insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 419.
In this case, the Silver Smith's contacts do not rise to t!:

rkins

necessary for I Jtal I to exercise general personal jurisdiction o v ei the Silver Smith, nor
does the Silver Smith's activity even rise to the level considered insufficient in
Helicopteros. The Silver Smith's contacts with Utah may be placed in three categories:
(1) advertising activities; (2) purchasing goods and services from Utah merchants; arid (3)
leasing Utah real property for parking lot and storage pi n poses ' Fills condi ict does not
come close In (lie type of pervasive activity found in Perkins which justified an exercise
of jurisdiction over actions completely unrelated to the non-resident's forum state
activities.

11

The Utah Court of Appeals recently determined that the Utah activities of another
Wendover hotel and casino operated by a Nevada corporation, State Line Hotel, Inc.,
were substantial and continuous and that Utah courts could exercise general personal
jurisdiction over it. Buddensick v. Stateline Hotel Inc., 972 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah Ct. App.
1998) cert denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999), cert, denied, 145 L.Ed. 2d 253, 120 S.Ct.
324 (1999). In that case, discovery was conducted concerning the State Line's contacts
with Utah and it revealed that the State Line
advertised its hotel and casino in Utah; contracts for goods and services in
Utah; uses a Utah insurance agent and a Utah law firm; leases from
Stateline Properties at least five parcels of property in Utah, two of which
are used for a parking lot, parking structure, and signage purposes directly
adjacent to Stateline's hotel and casino business in Nevada; maintains at
least two post office boxes in Utah, one of which Stateline shares with
Stateline Properties; and has a Utah cellular telephone number, regular
telephone number, and six Utah fax numbers.
Id. at 929.
By contrast, the evidence before the trial court in this case was that the Silver
Smith advertises in Utah, purchases some goods and services from Utah merchants, and is
the lessee under a lease of real property in Utah for parking lot and storage purposes.
Record at 19, 72, 73. The court of appeals in Buddensick held:
For the following reasons, we conclude that Stateline's activities are
"substantial and continuous" such that Utah may assert general personal
jurisdiction over Stateline. First, Stateline conducts extensive advertising
and promotional activities in Utah, including a toll-free telephone number.
Next, Stateline leases and possesses at least five parcels of real property in
Utah, including property neighboring its casino for a parking lot and
signage purposes. Further, Stateline contracts for goods and services with
Utah corporations, including food, linens, advertisements, and professional
12

services. Lastly, Stateline maintains two phone numbers, at least two post
office boxes, and six fax numbers in Utah. Thus, it is not unreasonable for
Stateline to be expected to be "hauled into court" in Utah. See World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-99, 100 S Ct. **9. %4~
67,62L.Ed.2d490(1980).
Buddensick, 972 l\2d at 931.
Mo argues iii IHT brief thai the Silver Smith's activities in Utah are substantially
identical to the State Line's activities in Utah. The record, however, shows that the Silver
Smith's Utah activities are as stated above: advertising, purchasing goods and services
and entering into a lease of Utah property for parking lot and storage purposes

•,

however, attached to It'1! hurl mullets« nnlmninp discovery from other cases not
involving the Silver Smith, information from the Internet, advertising and telephone book
listings, State of Nevada filings concerning Jim's Enterprises, Inc., copies of old
stationery of State Line Properties, Ltd. (a Utah limited partnership) ai id insurance policy
pages from another case Sec ullaelimcnls A-Ci, l-K of appellant's brief. None of these
items was submitted to the trial court and should not be considered by this Court.
Matters not admitted in evidence before the trier of fact cannot be considered for the first
time on appeal. Pilcherv. State Dept of Social Servs., 663 P,2d 4 SO, 45? (Utah 1083);
UtahDept of Transportation v I 'ullcr. M11 I\2d 81 4, 81 " (Utah 1«>7<>); Ebbert v. Ebbert,
744P.2d lOMMIItuhl I A|.|> I (>K71, cert denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
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A. Advertising in Another State is Generally Insufficient
to Confer General Personal Jurisdiction
Virtually all individual and corporate residents of states have some contact with
other states. Silver Smith advertises in Utah and purchases goods and services from Utah
merchants. Record at 19, 72. In regard to advertising, Silver Smith is like any other
lodging or entertainment operation located in one state which promotes its business to
citizens of another state. Many courts have held that advertising and promotion are not
"doing business" sufficient to give rise to general jurisdiction.
In State ex rel Circus Circus Reno, Inc. v. Pope, 317 Or. 151, 854 P.2d 461
(1993), an Oregon resident traveled to Reno, Nevada, and stayed at a hotel operated by
Circus Circus. The plaintiff was injured when he was hit by a liquor bottle thrown by an
unknown person from a window of the hotel. He sued Circus Circus, claiming
negligence. In Oregon, general jurisdiction can be obtained over a defendant who is
engaged in "substantial and not isolated activities within this state." 854 P.2d at 462. The
plaintiff argued that Circus Circus was subject to the state's general jurisdiction. The
Court listed the contacts of Circus Circus with Oregon:
It is undisputed by the parties that Circus Circus is not registered to
do business in Oregon, pays no business tax here, and has no bank accounts,
offices, real estate, employees, or exclusive agents in the state. [Plaintiff]
argues, however, that the activities of Circus Circus in Oregon nevertheless
are "substantial," because Circus Circus "regularly advertises its Reno hotel
in The Oregonian, because it distributed brochures describing that hotel to
Smith's Oregon travel agent, because it maintains a toll-free number for use
of Oregon residents, and because, after Smith reserved a room at its Reno
hotel, Circus Circus called Smith at his Oregon residence to confirm the
reservation."
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Id.
The court stated that it was not persuaded that the foregoing activities were
substantial and not isolated activities within the state. The court then rejected the specific
jurisdiction argument because the immediate effects of the plaintiffs injury were felt
within Nevada and not within Oregon as required by Oregon's long-arm statute. Id. at
463.
In Munley v. Second Judicial District Court, 761 P.2d 414 (Nev. 1988), the
plaintiff, a Nevada resident, was injured at a Lake Tahoe ski resort called "Northstar." He
sued Northstar in Nevada but Northstar claimed a lack of personal jurisdiction. The court
listed Northstar's contacts with Nevada:
The evidence presented to the district court shows that Northstar's contacts
with Nevada consisted solely of advertising and promotional activities.
These activities included continuous membership in the Reno/Sparks
Chamber of Commerce since 1984, the maintenance of a contract with a
Reno outdoor advertising company, the placement of one advertisement in
the Las Vegas Review Journal, the placement of an advertisement in the
Reno telephone directory, and the distribution of brochures to several ski
shops and sporting goods stores in the Reno area.
M a t 415.
The court in Munley rejected any argument that the requirements for general
jurisdiction had been met. "None of Northstar's promotional activities evince a pattern of
'substantial and continuous1 activities within this state sufficient to give rise to a presence
in Nevada and to confer general jurisdiction on the district court." Id. at 416.
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Similarly, in Congoleum Corp. v. D.L. W. Aktiengesellschaft, 729 F.2d 1240 (9th
Cir. 1984), the court of appeals affirmed a district court's dismissal of the complaint for
lack of personal jurisdiction over the German defendant. In that case, the defendant's
only activities in the forum state of California consisted of sales and marketing efforts
through a California company and a consultant. The activities of the company and the
consultant as agents for D.L.W. consisted of the solicitation of orders, the
recommendation of other sales agents, the ordering of samples, the promotion of D.L.W.
products to potential customers through mail and showroom display, and attendance at
trade shows and sales meetings. In affirming the dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction, the court stated:
Although many courts cite Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,
342 U.S. 437 (1952)] for the principle that personal jurisdiction may be
asserted where the cause of action is unrelated to the forum activity, no
court has ever held that the maintenance of even a substantial sales force
within the state is a sufficient contact to assert jurisdiction in an unrelated
cause of action.
Id. at 1242 (emphasis added).
Finally, in Price & Sons v. District Court, 831 P.2d 600 (Nev. 1992), the court
held that the Nevada courts did not have general jurisdiction over an out-of-state
membership department store, the Price Club, which had over 1,000 members in Nevada.
The Price Club regularly sent advertisements to its members and solicited memberships in
Nevada through an advertising flyer distributed through a Nevada credit union. The court
noted that general personal jurisdiction over a defendant for any cause of action is
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appropriate where the defendant's forum activities are so substantial or continuous and
systematic that the defendant may be deemed to be present in the forum state. "A high
level of contact with the forum state is necessary to establish general jurisdiction. Sales
and marketing efforts in the forum by a foreign corporation, without more, are
insufficient to establish general jurisdiction" Id. at 601 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
In its opinion in Buddensick, the Court of Appeals placed principal reliance on this
Court's decision in McGriffV. Charles Antell Inc., 123 Utah 166, 256 P.2d 703, (1953).
There, this Court stated:
The law, in our opinion, would be a faithless servant if today it demanded
that solicitation of business in and of itself subjected a foreign corporation
to the local forum.
Id. at 704. This Court did conclude that "this is not to say that in a proper case solicitation
plus something else, or use of radio plus something else, could not constitute doing
business in the jurisdiction." Id. at 704-05.
The McGr/^decision was but one of many decisions rendered by this Court which
became known collectively as the "solicitation plus" cases. See Strachan, In Personam
Jurisdiction in Utah, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 235, 236-37 (1977). In her article, Professor
Strachan concluded that McGriff and the other "solicitation plus" cases were of limited
value due to the lack of consistent analysis and reasoning:
Some general observations may be helpful to an understanding of the
"solicitation plus" cases. First, these cases were of slight precedential
value.
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Second, the court's approach was mechanical, quantitative, and
fairly simplistic. The court would typically refer to its checklist of "plus"
factors, briefly note the presence or absence of items on the checklist and
thereupon state its conclusion that the defendant was or was not doing
business in Utah. There was no analysis of the relative importance of the
"plus" factors and no indication of how many of the "plus" factors found to
be present or absent were necessary to the jurisdictional holding.
Third, although the court frequently stated that mere solicitation of
business was insufficient to constitute doing business, in many cases the
"plus" factors found to sustain personal jurisdiction were an integral part of
the solicitation. For example, the court could have regarded activities such
as maintaining a local office or local employees, installing a telephone and
office equipment, advertising products, or delivering orders, as the means
by which nonresident defendants solicited business within the state. Thus,
the mere solicitation distinction was a misnomer. In reality, the
"solicitation plus" standard of doing business was a flexible, though
superficial, test by which the Utah Court considered the total quantity of a
defendant's activity within the state. A limited quantity of activity would
not permit the assertion of personal jurisdiction. Substantial and continuous
activity by a nonresident defendant within the state, even though such
activity was inextricably related to the solicitation of business, was
sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.
Finally, although the "solicitation plus" cases generally contain little
reasoned analysis, occasional decisions provide some insight into the
conflicting policies underlying the court's strict jurisdictional standard of
substantial and continuous local activity. In a few of the numerous
decisions denying jurisdiction, the court founded its strict jurisdictional
standard on its conviction that a more lenient standard would injure the
welfare and economy of Utah by discouraging nonresidents from engaging
in commercial activity in Utah.2 In contrast, in the few decisions upholding
jurisdiction under the strict standard, the court occasionally based its
conclusion on the ground that a contrary result would impose an unfair

2

See Western Gas Appl, Inc. v. Servel Inc. 123 Utah 229, 236-37, 257 P.2d 950, 953
(1953); McGriffv. Charles Antell Inc. 123 Utah 166, 170, 71, 256 P.2d 703, 705 (1953).
See also Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 255, 342 P.2d 871, 875 (1959); Honerine
Mining & Milling Co. v. Tallerday Steel Pipe & Tank Co., 31 Utah 326, 335, 88 P. 9, 12
(1906).
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burden upon local plaintiffs to travel to a distant forum for a remedy.3
These two conflicting rationales were used to justify conclusions already
reached through mechanical application of the "solicitation plus" test. The
court never subjected the strict jurisdictional standard to critical
analysis-never tested that standard against the facts of a given case to
determine whether the standard was necessary to achieve the desired
economic result-and thus, the court never recognized the inherent conflict
between its two policy rationales.
Id. (footnotes in original).4
Silver Smith submits that this Court should define the nature of conduct which will
subject a party to the general jurisdiction of the courts of Utah. After all, the United
States Supreme Court has held that one of the primary aims of the Due Process Clause is
to provide a degree of predictability to an exercise of jurisdiction:
By requiring that individuals have "fair warning that a particular activity
may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign," Schaefer v.
Heitner, 433 US 186, 218, 53 L Ed 2d 683, 97 S Ct 2569 (1977)(Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment), the Due Process Clause "gives a degree of
predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to
structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where
that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.," World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 US 286,297, 62 L Ed 2d 490, 100 S
Ct 559 (1980).
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, All U.S. 462, 472, 85 L.Ed.2d 528, 105 S.Ct. 2174
(1985).

3

Wein v. Crockett, 113 Utah 301, 314, 195 P.2d 222, 228-29 (1948); Wabash R.R. v.
District Court, 109 Utah 526, 537-38, 167 P.2d 973, 978 (1946).
4

Incidentally, Professor Strachan's "able article" was heavily relied upon by this Court
in clarifying the distinction between "general" and "specific" jurisdiction. Abbott GM.
Diesel Inc., v. Piper Aircraft, 578 P.2d 850, 852 (Utah 1978).
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As a consequence of the lack of analysis contained in the "solicitation plus" cases,
and the intervention of the concept of "specific" jurisdiction, this Court has had few, if
any, opportunities to elucidate the nature of conduct which will subject a non-resident to
the general jurisdiction of Utah courts for conduct unrelated to any forum state conduct.
Moreover, aside from the issue of what conduct may constitute "doing business" in
Utah, perhaps a more compelling question is whether the Silver Smith's conduct in Utah
would permit the trial court to exercise jurisdiction consistent with the Due Process
Clause. As set forth above, there is little dispute that, like specific jurisdiction, a state's
exercise of general jurisdiction is limited by the Due Process Clause. However, neither
this Court nor the Utah Court of Appeals has ever discussed the level of conduct
necessary to constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over defendants for matters unrelated to
the non-resident's forum state activities.
Because the specific jurisdiction analysis often focuses on "traditional notions of
fair play and justice" and the convenience to a defendant, it is often overlooked that the
Due Process limitations on the jurisdictional power of the state also serve to maintain
balance between the states. The United States Supreme Court has stated:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being
forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum
State has a strong interest in applying its laws to the controversy; even if the
forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process
Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act
to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.
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World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, AAA U.S. 286,294-95, 62 L.Ed.2d 490, 100
S.Ct. 559 (1979). The Court has also stated:
Nevertheless, we have never accepted the proposition that state lines
are irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful
to the principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution. The
economic interdependence of the States was foreseen and desired by the
Framers. In the Commerce Clause, they provided that the Nation was to be
a common market, a "free trade unit" in which the States are debarred from
acting as separate economic entities. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond,
336 US 525, 538, 93 L Ed 865, 69 S Ct 657 (1949). But the Framers also
intended that the States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty,
including, in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their courts.
The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the
sovereignty of all of its sister States—a limitation express or implicit in both
the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Hence, even while abandoning the shibboleth that "[t]he authority of
every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in
which it is established," Pennoyer v. Neff, supra, at 720, 24 L Ed 565, we
emphasized that the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction must be
assessed "in the context of our federal system of government," International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra., at 317, 90 L Ed 95, 66 S Ct 154, 161 ALR
1057, and stressed that the Due Process Clause ensures not only fairness,
but also the "orderly administration of the laws."
Id.
These considerations become far more critical when a state seeks to exercise
jurisdiction over non-residents for conduct and matters occurring entirely without its
boundaries. When a state exercises specific jurisdiction over a non-resident for activities
relating to the forum, the state does no more than call the non-resident to account for
activities conducted within the forum state. However, general jurisdiction is an exercise
of power over a non-resident and regarding activities and conduct that occurred outside
the State of Utah, and which the State has a minimal interest in controlling. Thus, the
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exercise of general jurisdiction is a far greater assertion of power within the system of
interstate federalism, and consequently, requires a higher level of conduct before Due
Process concerns are satisfied.
When, as here, the plaintiff is a resident of the forum state, it is easy to forget that
a finding of "general" jurisdiction is an assertion by this Court that it may, consistent with
the Due Process Clause, exercise jurisdiction over matters entirely unrelated to the forum
state activities. For example, if this Court concludes that general jurisdiction exists, the
Court would be concluding that it would have the power to hear a dispute brought by a
Maine resident who alleged she slipped and fell at the Silver Smith. Moreover, if an
employee of the Silver Smith were involved in an automobile accident in Idaho with an
Idaho resident, general jurisdiction would permit the Idaho resident to sue in Utah. This
Court should be ever-cognizant that a finding of general jurisdiction would extend this
Court's power to regulate the Silver Smith to conduct not only arising entirely outside
Utah, but also over disputes between the Silver Smith and residents of any other state.
Because general jurisdiction extends to matters unrelated to the forum state activities of
the Defendant, the plaintiff need not necessarily be a resident of Utah to avail itself of this
forum's jurisdiction.
The issue of the level of conduct necessary for a Utah court to exercise general
jurisdiction consistent with the Due Process Clause has never been addressed by this
Court, but remains an important question of state and federal law which should be
decided by this Court.
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B. Silver Smith's Leasing Real Property in Utah
is not Enough to Confer General Jurisdiction
Plaintiff has not cited any authority for the proposition that a foreign defendant's
leasing real property in the forum state will result in the defendant's being haled into
court for all purposes.
Plaintiff does, however, miscite Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 895 P.2d 839
(Utah Ct App. 1995), affd, 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996), apparently for the proposition
that leasing real property may result in a finding of general personal jurisdiction. The
sole issue in Hebertson was whether the owners of the real property on which the plaintiff
was injured did business as Willowcreek Plaza, which was the name given to the
property. Id. at 840. The court, however, made reference to doing business for
jurisdictional purposes and listed the ownership of property as a factor to consider. Id. at
840-41. The court cited Radcliffe v. Akhavan, 875 P.2d 608 (Utah Ct. App. 1994);
however, Radcliffe was a specific personal jurisdiction case.
Accordingly, the Silver Smith's activities in Utah are not substantial and
continuous such that the Silver Smith is doing business in Utah. Moreover, a conclusion
that general jurisdiction is appropriate under the facts of this case would not comport with
due process.
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II.
PLAINTIFFS INJURIES DID NOT ARISE OUT OF DEFENDANT'S
CONTACTS WITH UTAH; THEREFORE, NO SPECIFIC
PERSONAL JURISDICTION EXISTS
To determine whether specific personal jurisdiction over the Silver Smith exists,
one must turn to Utah's Long Arm Statute. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-24 (Supp. 1999)
provides:
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether or not a
citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any
of the following enumerated acts, submits himself... to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this state as to any claim arising from or related to:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state;
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by breach
of warranty;
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this state.

A. Plaintiffs Injuries Must Arise Out of or Relate to Defendant's Contacts
With Utah for the Long Arm Statute to Apply
Plaintiff was injured when she was in the Silver Smith casino waiting for a gaming
table and was struck by a Silver Smith employee with a drink tray. Plaintiff was not
injured as a result of advertising or promotion of the Silver Smith, nor as a result of Silver
Smith's obtaining goods and services from Utah merchants nor as a result of State Line's
leasing real property in Utah. Unquestionably, her injury was not caused in Utah.
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There is no question but that the alleged injury must arise out of or be related to
the Silver Smith's contacts with Utah for Utah to exercise specific personal jurisdiction
over the Silver Smith under the Long Arm Statute. Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco, Inc., 610
P.2d 1307, 1311 (Utah 1980). In Roskelley, the Utah Supreme Court stated that it does
not assist plaintiff to show the contacts defendant has with Utah if the specific litigation
does not arise out of any of these contacts. Id. See also Abbot G.M. Diesel, Inc. v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 578 P.2d 850, 853 (Utah 1978) ("'where the defendant has only minimum
contacts with the forum [i.e., no general jurisdiction exists], personal jurisdiction may be
asserted only on claims arising out of the defendant's forum-state activity.1") (citation
omitted.)
Finally, there is a constitutional due process element to personal jurisdiction. In
Arguello v. Indus. Woodworking Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1992), the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
To exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, the non-resident
defendant must have "minimum contacts with the forum state such that the
maintenance of this suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.1"
Id. at 1123, quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 90 L.Ed.
95,66S.Ct. 154(1945).
The defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting
activities in Utah and must have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in Utah.
Kamdar & Co. v. Laray Co., Inc., 815 P.2d 245, 249 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citations
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omitted). In addition, the court must balance the convenience of the parties and the
interests of the state in assuming jurisdiction by examining the relationship of the
defendant, the forum and the litigation to each other. Id.
Although the Silver Smith purposefully availed itself of purchasing advertising,
services and goods in Utah, it cannot be said that, as a result, it reasonably anticipated
being summoned into a Utah court for an incident that occurred in Nevada, on its
premises.
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), the United
States Supreme Court discussed the concept of minimum contacts. It stated:
It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or
inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through their
courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status
as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.
Id. at 292 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Court noted that although the limits
imposed on state jurisdiction by the Due Process Clause have been relaxed over the years,
"we have never accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional
purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the principles of interstate federalism
embodied in the Constitution." Id. at 293. The Court noted that although the framers of
the Constitution foresaw that the nation would be a common market, they also
intended that the States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty,
including, in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their courts.
The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the
sovereignty of all its sister States — a limitation express or implicit in both
the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Id. at 293.
Finally, the Court observed that the Due Process Clause does not contemplate that
a state can make binding judgments against individuals or corporate defendants with
which the state has no contacts, ties or relations.
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being
forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum
State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the
forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process
Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act
to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.
Id. at 294 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283, 78 S.Ct. 1228
(1958)).
In applying the relevant factors listed by the Court in determining the
reasonableness of requiring a foreign defendant to litigate a case in the forum, none of the
factors support keeping this case in Utah. Utah has little interest in adjudicating this
personal injury lawsuit which arose in Nevada between a Nevada corporation and a Utah
resident. Certainly Utah has much less interest in adjudicating this dispute than does
Nevada. Although Ho has an interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, her
interests would have been promoted by litigating her suit in Nevada, a state which has a
keen interest in ensuring safe environments for visitors to its hotels and casinos.
B. Plaintiffs Injuries Did Not, Factually or Legally, Arise Out of
Defendant's Advertising Its Business in Utah
In her complaint, Ho alleges a negligence cause of action. Record at 1-7. She
claims she was injured while waiting for a gaming table in the casino when an employee
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struck her with a drink tray. She claims that Silver Smith had a duty to maintain its
premises in a safe manner and that it breached that duty. She claims she was injured as a
result and is entitled to special and general damages.
In her brief, however, Ho claims that this court has specific personal jurisdiction
over the Silver Smith because her injury arose out of Silver Smith's advertising and
promotional activities in Utah. Brief of Appellant at 45. There is no record support for
Ho's claim that her injuries arose from Defendant's advertising, but even if there were,
that would not change the fact that her injuries did not arise out of or relate to the
advertising.
Ho relies on two decisions from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, both of
which have been vacated or reversed. Plaintiff relies on Alexander v. Circus Circus
Enterprises, Inc., 939 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1991), for that court's analysis, which is that but
for the defendant's forum-related activities in soliciting business, the plaintiff would not
have gone to the defendant's place of business and been injured. Id. at 853. The court in
Alexander relied on Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990).
As stated, neither Alexander nor Shute are good law. In Alexander v. Circus
Circus Enterprises, Inc., 972 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1992), the court of appeals withdrew its
earlier opinion reported at 939 F.2d 847, upon which Plaintiff relies. In the later decision,
the court granted the defendant's petition for rehearing, withdrew its prior opinion, and
affirmed the district court's quashing service of summons and dismissing the complaint
based on absence of personal jurisdiction. 972 F.2d at 262. Shute was reversed in
28

Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585,113 L.Ed.2d 622, 111 S.Ct. 1522
(1991). On remand to the Ninth Circuit, 934 F.2d 1091, the court of appeals affirmed the
judgment of the district court which had originally granted the cruise line's motion for
summary judgment on lack of personal jurisdiction.
To the extent the Ninth Circuit's "but for" analysis survives, however, it is a
distinctly minority position and has been sharply criticized.5 This Court has addressed
and rejected such a broad reading of the Long Arm Statute in Roskelly & Co. v. Lerco,
Inc., 610 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1980). In Roskelly, Justice Stewart dissented from the majority
and advocated a broad construction of the phrase "arising out o f to include any injury
which "lies in the wake o f or has a "close relationship" with the defendant's forum state
activities. Id. at 1316. However, the majority concluded that "the broad construction the
dissent would give the term 'arose from' is unwarranted, and is unsupported by the cases
cited therein." Id. at 1310.

5

In State ex rel Circus Circus v. Pope, 317 Or. 151, 854 P.2d 461 (1993), the Oregon
Supreme Court reject the plaintiffs "but for" argument:
The Supreme Court of the United States does not apply a "but for" test, and
our reading of the pertinent Supreme Court cases convinces us that the
Supreme Court would not do so. We therefore decline Smith's invitation to
adopt the proposed "but for" test.
854 P.2d at 466. See also Wims v. Beach Terrace Motor Inn, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 264, 267
(E.D. Pa. 1991) (most courts addressing the issue have concluded that when plaintiffs
bring actions for personal injuries that occurred in another state and which allegedly
resulted from the defendant's negligent acts which also occurred in another state, the
cause of action does not arise from the defendant's forum contacts for purposes of
asserting personal jurisdiction).
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Utah's Long Arm Statute was amended recently to include the language, "or
related to." In State ex rel Circus Circus, the Court construed Oregon's statute which
also applies to conduct "aris[ing] out of or related to" the forum contacts and noted that
by advertising its Reno facilities in a major Oregon newspaper, providing brochures to the
plaintiffs travel agent, making available to Oregon residents a toll-free telephone
information service, and telephoning plaintiff to confirm his hotel reservations, defendant
purposefully directed its activities at residents of Oregon. "However, Smith's negligence
claim against Circus Circus does not 'arise out of or relate to1 the activities of Circus
Circus in Oregon." 854 P.2d at 466 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, All U.S.
462 (1985)). The court noted that plaintiff claimed that he was injured by a bottle thrown
from a window of a hotel and that his injuries resulted from Circus Circus's negligence
relating solely to the operation of its hotel in Nevada. Id.
Similarly, in Munley v. Second Judicial District Court, 761 P.2d 414 (Nev. 1988),
the court noted that even if Northstar's promotional activities in Nevada constituted
transacting business, the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that his cause of action arose
from those activities. The court specifically noted that the plaintiff alleged in his
Complaint that his injuries were proximately caused by the negligent management,
maintenance and operation of the ski chair lifts in California. "Indeed, there is nothing in
the record suggesting that Northstar's promotional activities in Nevada were related to its
alleged negligence in maintaining and operating its California chair lifts." Id. at 415
(citations omitted). Significantly, the court held that Northstar's promotional activities
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did not confer jurisdiction on the district court "even though petitioner's trip to Northstar
was in response to such promotional activities." Id. at 416.
Ho's specific personal jurisdiction argument is really a general personal
jurisdiction argument because it urges the Court to find personal jurisdiction based on
Silver Smith's Utah activities for an injury that did not arise from them nor is related to
them. In Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics Corp., 548 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1976), the Utah
Supreme Court observed that it is generally more fair and logical to find jurisdiction in
the forum where the activity occurred out of which the cause of action arose. Id. at 1259.
In this case, the Ho's cause of action arose, not out of the Silver Smith's contacts with
Utah, but out of alleged negligence which occurred in Nevada. Thus, there is no specific
personal jurisdiction over Silver Smith
III.
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE BUDDENSICK OPINION
WAS CONSIDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS MOOT AND HO'S
ARGUMENTS IN THIS REGARD FAIL

Ho claims that Silver Smith's failure to cite to the Buddensick opinion did not
allow the trial court an opportunity to make an informed decision as to whether the trial
court could exercise general personal jurisdiction over Silver Smith. This argument fails
for a number of reasons.
First, the trial court was, in fact, given the opportunity to review Buddensick
during the briefing of Ho's Motion to Reconsider. After the trial court entered its minute
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entry granting Silver Smith's Motion to Dismiss, Ho researched Utah law regarding
general personal jurisdiction and discovered the Buddensick decision. Ho believed that
Buddensick should have been considered by the trial court and so she filed a Motion to
Reconsider in which she fully summarized and argued the facts and law of Buddensick.
Record at 82-127. She also attached a copy of Buddensick to her memorandum. Record
at 120-23. In opposition to the Motion to Reconsider, Silver Smith presented written
arguments to the trial court regarding Buddensick. Record at 132-34. Ho presented yet
more arguments based on Buddensick in her reply memorandum. Record at 139-63.
Thus, the trial court was made well aware of Buddensick. If the trial court had found
Ho's jurisdictional arguments based on Buddensick persuasive, it could have granted the
Motion to Reconsider and set aside its minute entry on the Motion to Dismiss. Therefore,
the trial court had a more than adequate opportunity to consider the effect, if any, of
Buddensick on the jurisdictional issues raised in the Motion to Dismiss. Hence, the issue
of Silver Smith's alleged non-disclosure of Buddensick is moot because Buddensick was
disclosed to the trial court and it considered Buddensick in deciding whether to reconsider
its ruling on the Motion to Dismiss. In fact, the court did not enter the Order of Dismissal
until after it denied the Motion to Reconsider. Record at 170-71, 172-73. Significantly,
the trial court's granting the motion to dismiss will be reviewed for correctness. Thus, if
the trial court properly or improperly granted the motion, this court will affirm or reverse
the order, and it is irrelevant whether the trial court considered Buddensick.
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Second, there is a genuine issue as to whether Silver Smith was required to cite to
Buddensick at any time below. Rule 3.3(a)(3) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct
states: "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the
controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel." Silver Smith is unaware of any Utah
appellate cases or other Utah authority that has interpreted the above rule. While Ho, in
her brief, cites to cases from other jurisdictions and the notes of the American Bar
Association Committee on Professional Ethics, these opinions are not binding on this
Court or Utah lawyers. See Regional Sales Agency, Inc v. Reichert, 830 P.2d 252, 256
(Utah 1992) (stating that the Court looks to ABA advisory committee notes and cases
from other jurisdictions for guidance).
The issue under Rule 3.3(a)(3) is whether the Buddensick opinion is "directly
adverse" to the interests of Silver Smith in the present case. The terms "directly adverse"
can and should be read as meaning controlling or dispositive authority. The use of the
word "directly" indicates that only controlling or dispositive authority must be disclosed.
If the intended meaning was authority that bears on the issue in a negative way, then the
word "directly" would not have been used because the word "adverse" alone would have
sufficed. Thus, a reasonable interpretation of the rule required counsel for Silver Smith to
disclose Buddensick only if it was dispositive of the jurisdictional issue.
While it is true that Buddensick addresses the issue of general personal jurisdiction
in Utah, it does not establish a precedent that necessarily would have defeated Silver
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Smith's Motion to Dismiss. Rather, Buddensick reviewed prior case law and compiled a
list of factors to consider when determining if general personal jurisdiction exists.
Buddensick, 972 P.2d at 930-31. Based on its review of the factors applicable to the
defendant casino, the Buddensick court found that the Utah trial court could properly
exercise general personal jurisdiction over the defendant casino. Id. at 931. Contrary to
what Ho would have the Court believe, it does not stand for the proposition that Utah
courts have general personal jurisdiction over all Wendover casinos. The determination
of general personal jurisdiction is a fact intensive process and the circumstances of each
case must be addressed individually. Id. at 930. The Buddensick court emphasized the
factual nature of the determination: "each case factually must be examined as it arises. A
hard and fast formula cannot determine algebraically every case." Id. (quoting McGriffv.
Charles Antell, Inc., 256 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1953)). As discussed more fully above,
Buddensick was a separate case with a different defendant and distinct circumstances.
The ruling as to the defendant casino in Buddensick does not apply directly to Silver
Smith in the present case. The defendant casino in Buddensick had many more contacts
with the state than Silver Smith, and the nature and extent of the contacts were more
pervasive. Record at 19, 72-73. Buddensick, 972 P.2d at 929. Therefore, the ruling in
Buddensick was not dispositive of the jurisdictional issue in the present matter.
Third, in their memoranda regarding the Motion to Dismiss, the parties provided
the trial court with the appropriate legal standards to apply in deciding whether general
personal jurisdiction could be exercised over Silver Smith. The comments to Rule 3.3 of
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the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct under the heading "Misleading Legal Argument"
state that "[t]he underlying concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to
determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case." The underlying concept or
purpose of Rule 3.3(a)(3) was fulfilled in the present case because the legal standards
regarding general personal jurisdiction were presented to the trial court during the
briefing of the Motion to Dismiss.
The Buddensick case is just one of innumerable cases from Utah and around the
country addressing the issue of general personal jurisdiction. The Buddensick court
surveyed the vast array of cases and distilled a set of relevant factors to consider when
deciding whether general personal jurisdiction exists. Id. at 930-31. Both Ho and Silver
Smith cited many cases in their respective memoranda which set forth all of the factors to
consider. Record at 12-19, 27-41, and 42-56. All but two of the twelve factors identified
in Buddensick opinion were considered by the trial court in deciding the Motion to
Dismiss in the present matter.6 The following excerpt from Ho's memorandum in
opposition to the Motion to Dismiss identified most of the relevant factors:
Whether a non-resident defendant is doing business so as to subject it to
jurisdiction of its courts, this court needs to determine whether the
defendant has local offices, stores or outlets, presence of personnel,
solicitation of business, presence of its property, real or personal, whether

6

The two factors not raised by the parties were (1) presence of shareholders within the
state and (2) generation of a substantial percentage of its national sales through revenue
generated from in-state customers. Buddensick, 972 P.2d at 930-31. Ho failed to seek
discovery or present evidence regarding these factors. Thus, their non-inclusion in the
argument was irrelevant.
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these activities are sporadic or transitory as compared to continuous and
systematic. [Citations omitted.]
Although this defendant is not registered to run a gambling place
within Utah, and although its principal place of business is in Wendover, it
routinely advertises its business in Utah and solicits for patrons from Utah;
it continuously leases real or otherwise manages personal property located
right inside Utah to accommodate the arrivals of bus [sic] loaded passengers
from Utah; it actively built maintains, and or uses the parking lots and
storage facilities; it regularly buys Utah products, and hires Utah residents
for personal services.
Record at 32-33 (emphasis added). The following excerpt from Silver Smith's reply
memorandum in support of the Motion to Dismiss identified additional relevant factors:
It is undisputed by the parties that Circus Circus is not registered to do
business in Oregon, pays no business tax here, and has no bank accounts,
offices, real estate, employees or exclusive agents in the state. Plaintiff
argues, however, that the activities of Circus Circus in Oregon nevertheless
are "substantial," because Circus Circus "regularly advertises its Reno hotel
in The Oregonian, because it distributed brochures describing that hotel to
Smith *s Oregon travel agent, because it maintains a toll-free number for use
of Oregon residents,....
Record at 51 (emphasis added).
The trial court was made aware of virtually all of the factors identified in
Buddensick, and Ho was afforded a reasonable opportunity to present her arguments
regarding the factors. Therefore, the trial court was informed of the legal standards
applicable to the issue of whether general personal jurisdiction existed.
Fourth, in her Complaint, Ho alleged only that the trial court had specific personal
jurisdiction over Silver Smith. There was no allegation in the Complaint that the court
had general personal jurisdiction over Silver Smith. Thus, the memorandum in support of
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the Motion to Dismiss argued that the action should be dismissed because the court
lacked specific personal jurisdiction over Silver Smith. Because Ho alleged only specific
personal jurisdiction, the Motion to Dismiss focused on that issue. The issue of general
personal jurisdiction, which was the issue in Buddensick, was not the focus of the Motion
to Dismiss, inasmuch as it had not been pleaded in the Complaint. Ho made a tenuous
general personal jurisdiction argument in her memorandum in opposition, but still
focused on her specific personal jurisdiction argument. Record at 27-41.
Finally, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Buddensick on December
24, 1998, approximately seven months before Ho filed her Complaint to initiate the
present lawsuit. As with all published Utah appellate decisions, the opinion was promptly
made available to the public through both book and electronic services. Thus, there is no
reasonable excuse for her failure to cite Buddensick if she desired to do so. This is
particularly true in light of the fact that Ho did extensive legal research of the
jurisdictional issue as evidenced by the 35 cases cited in her memorandum in opposition
to the Motion to Dismiss. Indeed, given the disparity in their contacts with Utah between
the defendant in Buddensick and the Silver Smith in this case, it is understandable that Ho
did not rely on Buddensick in her memorandum opposing the Motion to Dismiss.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Silver Smith respectfully requests that the Court affirm
the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff s complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
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